THE NoRRis-LAGuARDIA AcT
The Norris-LaGuardia Act embodies policies designed to effect profound changes in the role of the federal government and federal institutions in the regulation of labor disputes. Prior to 1932, federal courts had jurisdiction, mainly in diversity and Sherman Act cases, 5 over a broad range of union activities. Acting without legislative guides, federal judges were inclined to decide labor controversies according to their own predominantly conservative social and political views, and rendered decisions which were generally hostile to the union's use of economic power. 6 Under the prima facie tort doctrine, an intentional injury inflicted through the use of economic pressure was unlawful unless a court found it justified by the self-interest of the defendant union. 7 Moreover, even if the objectives were found to be legitimate, economic pressure could be exerted only through means receiving judicial approbation. 8 The imprecise terms of the Sherman Act furnished another vehicle for restraining union activity, since "restraint of trade" could be found in almost any effective use of economic pressure. 9 Both the tort and Sherman Act doctrines were used to prohibit activities such as secondary boycotts, 10 recognition strikes," make-work practices,' 2 and picketing.' 3 Attempts to organize nonunion employees were brought within the tort of interference with beneficial contractual relations by judicial protection of the "yellow dog" contract-the 5. Federal courts regulated labor disputes under three heads of original jurisdiction. The first was diversity of citizenship between the opposing parties, under 36 Stat. 1091 Stat. (1911 , now 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958) . Before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) , federal courts were free to fashion the law applicable to these suits.
The second head was federal question jurisdiction over suits for injunctions under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 737 (1914) , 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958) , against violations of the Sherman Anti-trust Law, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) , as amended, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7, 10 (1958) .
Federal courts also exercised jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting interstate commerce and the statutes pertaining thereto. See, e.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) .
For a full discussion of federal jurisdiction over labor disputes, see generally FRANK-FURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION 5-17 (1930) 7. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896 Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa 1905) (no such thing as "peaceful picketing") ; Levy & Devaney, Inc. v. International Pocketbook Workers Union, 114 Conn. 319, 158 Ati. 795 (1932) .
9. See notes 97-102 infra and accompanying text. 10. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37 (1927) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) .
11. Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 35 F.2d 203 (E.D. Pa. 1929) . 12. United States v. Painters Dist. Council, 44 F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1930 ), aff'd, 284 U.S. 582 (1931 ; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (8th Cir. 1897) .
13. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921) .
HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 71 1960-1961 employee's promise not to join a union, extracted as a condition of employment. 14 Thus, through this often amorphous body of law, the courts themselves undertook to define the "area of allowable economic conflict."' 1 The foundation of this judicial regulation was the labor injunction. Damage suits had proved unsatisfactory to employers seeking relief against illegal union activities." 0 Unions were often judgment-proof ;1' there were procedural difficulties in suing labor organizations as entities ;18 juries were available to the defendant unions ;19 and such actions rarely provided relief until long after the dispute was over. 20 The injunction, however, did not suffer from these handicaps and provided relatively swift and comprehensive relief. A temporary restraining order against the union could be obtained within a matter of hours. 21 Because decrees often enjoined a broad class of persons 22 and a wide range of activities, including even peaceful persuasion and leaving the job,2 these prohibitory clauses served as a vehicle for detailed judicial policing of 14. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) ; UMW v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927) . Any employer willing to compel employee acquiescence could effectively foreclose all union organizational efforts directed at his business. See WiTrE 220-30. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 412, 182 N.E. 63, 66 (1932) (Pound, 
15.

CJ.).
16. Before 1928 only one damage suit brought against a union under the Sherman Act resulted in a substantial monetary award, while 52% of the criminal prosecutions brought by the government resulted in convictions, and private suits for injunctions brought under § 16 of the Clayton Act were successful in 71% of the cases. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN Acr 212-15 (1930 For injunctions prohibiting leaving the job, see Western Union Tel. v. Local 134, IBEW, 2 F.2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 1924 ), aff'd, 6 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1925 (decree printed in 1928 Hearings 112) . For other kinds of activity enjoined, see United States v. Railway Employees' Dep't, 283 Fed. 479 (N.D. Ill. 1922) HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 72 [1960] [1961] labor disputes. Moreover, violators of the order might be subject to criminal and civil contempt proceedings held without a jury and before the same judge who had issued the original decree. 24 The initial stages of the injunctive process were particularly subject to procedural inadequacies and substantive error. Since to be effective the temporary injunction had to be issued swiftly, the trial judge's decision was made hastily in an atmosphere often highly-charged with emotion. The amorphous character of the substantive law also contributed to the possibility of error, as did the inadequacy of evidence before the judge. 25 To achieve speed, temporary restraining orders were issued ex parte upon the filing of standardized formbook complaints, 2 and, at the preliminary hearing, temporary injunctions were often issued solely on the basis of slanted, vague affidavits, whose allegations were safe from cross-examination.
2 7 Errors made in the early stages of the proceedings could, in theory, be corrected by the subsequent full dress trial necessary to the issuance of a permanent injunction, or on appeal. In practice, however, such corrective action would be ineffective, for such proceedings ordinarily came too late to repair the damage to the union. Rather than maintaining the status quo, the temporary injunction usually effected a final settlement of the dispute, for even a brief interruption of the strike could break union morale and hold the union's economic power in check while the employer was free to retaliate. 28 The finality of this remedy was demonstrated by the relative infrequency with which employers sought permanent injunctions.
0
The Norris-LaGuardia Act can be viewed as a three-pronged attack on judge-made labor law and its administration. First, the act rejected the injunction as a remedy in labor disputes. Second, it declared that federal courts were not the proper agency of the government to formulate substantive labor policy. Third, it repudiated the federal common law of labor relations and established a policy of governmental neutrality in labor disputes as a means of aiding the growth of organized labor. 30 Although the act's policy of govern- The policy and purpose which give meaning to the present legislation is its implicit declaration that the government shall occupy a neutral position, lending its
1960]
HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 73 1960-1961 mental neutrality has given way to pervasive federal regulation, its remedial proscriptions and strictures on the role of the judiciary remain fundamental to the scheme of federal labor law.
The view that injunctions per se are an inappropriate remedy in labor disputes is reflected in the broad and unequivocal prohibitions imposed by the act. Federal courts are denied all power to issue both temporary and permanent injunctions in nonviolent labor disputes. 31 In addition to this general statement, section 4 of the act explicitly immunizes specific activities such as refusal to work, picketing, and payment of strike benefits. 32 No distinction is drawn between "lawful" and "unlawful" nonviolent activities ;3 the act renders federal judges powerless even to enjoin action prohibited by substantive law. Moreover, in the limited area where injunctions are permitted in order to prevent violence, the act prescribes detailed procedures which the court must follow. Under section 7,34 no temporary or permanent injunction may be issued unless supported by oral testimony subject to cross-examination. Furthermore, ex parte orders are available only if necessary to prevent injury to property and lapse after five days. In addition, section 11 35 grants a jury trial to persons charged with contempt for violations of orders issued under the act.
Withdrawal of the injunctive power not only abolished the use of a particular remedy-it also put federal courts out of the business of making labor policy. Shorn of their only meaningful enforcement powers, federal courts were no longer looked to by litigants as an effective check upon economic coercion. 36 The legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia indicates that the Congress intended this result, believing that institutionally courts were ill-suited to make policy in labor matters. Excessive intervention in labor strife had extraordinary power neither to those who would have labor unorganized nor to those who would organize it and limiting its action to the preservation of order and the restraint of fraud. 75 CONG. Rxc. 4915 (1932) . This policy is reflected in § 2 of Norris-LaGuardia, 47 Stat. 70 (1932 ), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958 'd, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939) .
[T]he words "unlawful acts" in section 7(a) . . . do not constitute a reference to anything that may be considered illegal, but specifically to the acts of violence which the authority of the executive is calculated to control. 105 F.2d at 952. 34. 47 Stat. 71 (1932) WITT. 131 ("The most important aspect of the reaction of labor injunctions upon the courts is their weakened prestige.").
38. In both Houses of Congress the debate over the passage of Norris-LaGuardia focused on the role of the courts. Senator Norris observed:
[I]t is because we have now on the bench some judges-and undoubtedly we will have others-who lack that judicial poise necessary in passing upon the disputes between labor and capital that such a law as is proposed in this bill is necessary. 75 CONG. REc. 4510 (1932) . See also id. at 5478 (remarks of Representative LaGuardia). One appointee to the Supreme Court was denied confirmation by the Senate in 1930 principally because of his injunction record. WrrTE 127-28. Representative LaGuardia observed that the injunction had been used "to break a strike; to take one side of an issue; to determine wages and standards of living by the brute force of judicial power-instead of leaving it to a matter of adjustment by free American workers." 75 CONG. REc. 5480 (1932) .
39. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 83-88 (2d rev. ed., 1958) . 40. See Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 370 n.7 (1960) (Norris-LaGuardia "was prompted by a desire... to withdraw federal courts from a type of controversy for which many believed they were ill-suited and from participation in which, it was feared, judicial prestige might suffer").
The legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia is replete with statements which support the Supreme Court's interpretation:
We are trying to reestablish a system of laws for the government of the courts. We are writing a law binding the courts to a definite course of action with reference Interpretation of Norris-LaGuardia as a broad prohibition on judicial formulation of labor policy finds support in specific provisions of the statute. The act outlaws both permanent and temporary injunctions, although the permanent injunction suffered from none of the procedural flaws which marred the temporary decree.
4 1 And section 13, defining the term "labor dispute" in exceedingly broad terms, 42 radically changed the role of the courts in analyzing labor cases. While older theories, such as the prima facie tort doctrine, had required courts to determine the extent to which a union's self-interest justified coercive action, 43 judicial inquiry under Norris-LaGuardia is limited to the narrow question of whether the union has such an interest in the dispute. 44 Moreover, the broad prohibitions of the act, encompassing almost all labormanagement controversies and ignoring all distinctions betveen lawful and unlawful peaceful activity, indicate congressional fear of judicially created exceptions 45 and a desire to limit judicial discretion in applying the act.
NORRIs-LAGUARDIA AND THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Norris-LaGuardia prohibition against labor injunctions first came into conflict with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 46 passed in 1926 and substantially amended in 1934. Although the RLA establishes substantive rights and duties which require judicial enforcement, the draftsmen of the to injunctions. We are not disturbing the government of laws but we are taking away from the courts their right to act as if they were a government of men.
75 CONG. REc. 4509 (1932) (Representative Oliver).
The public policy laid down in the bill, I think, is essential, because there should be some standard by which the courts may know, at a time when they are in such confusion, what it is proper to do. I think the most fitting and, in reality, the only proper tribunal to express such a policy is the Congress. Id. at 5470 (Representative Browning). 46. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) , as amended, 45 U.S.C. § § 151-63, 181-88 (1958) .
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HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 76 1960-1961 statute would limit the remedial power of courts in RLA cases. In some cases, injunctive relief may be necessary to enforce these rights and duties. If Norris-LaGuardia were held to prohibit injunctions in all railway labor disputes, therefore, some policies of the RLA must be subordinated to the policy of the anti-injunction statute.
The Railway Labor Act regulates collective bargaining on the railroads and airlines. Like the National Labor Relations Act, it guarantees the right to organize 47 and establishes an employer duty to recognize and bargain with the majority union ;48 unlike the NLRA, the RLA does not create an agency empowered to guarantee these rights, but leaves their enforcement to the courts. 49 Nor does the RLA place express limitations on union use of economic force or regulate the parties by a detailed system of unfair labor practices. Certain responsibilities, however, are entrusted to two agencies, the National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB) and the National Mediation Board (NMB).r' Their functions are divided along lines corresponding to the statutory distinction between so-called "minor" disputes-grievances involving the interpretation or application of existing collective agreements-and "major" disputes-controversies over the negotiation of terms for future agreements. 5 ' The NRAB is empowered to render a "final and binding" decision over a "minor" dispute; arbitration of such grievances is compulsory upon submission by either party. 52 The resolution of "major" disputes, on the other hand, is left to free collective bargaining and the use of economic force, subject only to certain procedural requirements. The power of the NMB in these disputes is limited to mediation. The RLA contains several provisions designed to maintain the status quo during the early stages of a major dispute. Railway Labor Act § 6, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934 , 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1958) , provides that parties desiring changes in agreements give 30 days notice and that "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered ... until
1960]
HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 77 [1960] [1961] Before Norris-LaGuardia stripped federal courts of injunctive power, injunctions were granted when necessary to implement the RLA's policies. 4 When the RLA was subsequently amended, the draftsmen's failure to consider the effects of Norris-LaGuardia raised the possibility that injunctive relief might no longer be available. In Virginian Ry. v. Systent Fed'n No. 40, ' 5 however, the Supreme Court held that Norris-LaGuardia does not forbid issuance of a mandatory injunction commanding an employer to bargain with a certified union. The Court found that while Norris-LaGuardia outlawed use of broad prohibitory injunctions against labor unions, it did not prohibit a mandatory injunction against an employer.r 6 This position finds no support in the language of that act, for the statute does not distinguish between mandatory and prohibitory orders G7 and applies to suits against employers as well as unions.5
8 But the Court also relied upon the canon of construction that specific provisions of later statutes must prevail over conflicting provisions which are earlier and more general.
5 9 This approach seems not to depend upon a finding that Congress explicitly intended to repeal portions of Norris-LaGuardia; rather, it postulates two independent statutory provisions inconsistent with each other-here, that the employer's duty to bargain under the RLA the controversy has been finally acted upon as required by section 5 of this Act, by the Mediation Board . . . ." Railway Labor Act § 5, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195 (1934 , 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1958) , orders continuance of the status quo until 30 days after NMB notice of the failure of its mediatory efforts. Section 10, 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1958) , provides for the establishment of an emergency board after mediation fails and states that "[a]fter the creation of such a board, and for thirty days after such board has made its report to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the! controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose." The NMB, unlike the NRAB, has no power to adjudicate and determine the merits of a dispute. Railway Labor Act § 5 First, limits the NMB's function to mediation and recommendation of arbitration, which either party may refuse. The Board, however, is empowered by § 2 Ninth, 48 Stat. 1186 Stat. (1934 , 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth (1958) , to certify majority bargaining representatives, a determination which has been held to be nonreviewable by the courts. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943 § 101 (1958) . This language, moreover, seems broad enough to include mandatory decrees.
The court did not mention the fact that the original anti-injunction bill approved by the conference committee contained a provision specifically prohibiting the issuance of mandatory injunctions in labor disputes. Without explanation, the bill was withdrawn, sent back to conference, and that provision was eliminated. 75 CONG. Rc. 6188, 6240, 6327-29, 6334-37 (1932) .
58. The Senate Report stated, "[T]he same rule throughout the bill, wherever it is applicable, applies both to employers and employees, and also to organizations of employers and employees." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932) .
59. 300 U.S. at 563.
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HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 78 1960-1961 is meaningless without the injunctive sanction to enforce it. The Court must choose between the competing provisions, using whatever guides it can find to approximate the decision Congress would have made if faced with the choice. The Court focused upon the facts that the Railway Labor Act was more specific than Norris-LaGuardia and that, as amended, it was the more recent statute. If the conflict were only between two provisions giving different answers to the same question, and if one answer had been specifically adopted by a later Congress, this canon would seem adequate to the problem. But the conflict between Norris-LaGuardia and the Railway Labor Act is not of this order. Norris-LaGuardia disapproves of the injunction as a remedy, even when the acts enjoined would be, in result, undesirable or unlawful. It is not enough, therefore, to find that a later Congress specifically intended that management should be made to bargain; the Court must find that Congress would have desired that result even at the cost of using an undesirable remedy. In order to judge how far Congress would have been willing to go in order to effectuate its RLA policy, a court must introduce another factor into the analysis-the importance or significance of the RLA provision. Although Virginian Ry. did not consider this additional factor, the Court's holding can be reconciled with this view. The Court could have found that the provision ordering the employer to bargain was so crucial that inability to enforce it would have entirely undermined this major policy of federal labor legislation. By comparison, the encroachment upon Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction policy can be held to a minimum. While an injunctive decree must be granted, the courts may still insist upon compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia provisions framed to secure procedural fairness: guarantees of adequate notice, hearing with oral testimony subject to cross-examination, and jury trials for contempt proceedings. § 3692 (1958) .
Because the RLA was drafted without consideration of Norris-LaGuardia's prohibitions, courts should not employ the all-or-nothing approach implicit in the labels "repeal" or "takes precedence" when attempting to harmonize the two pieces of legislation. Cf. State of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945) Injunctions under the Railway Labor Act have also been granted to protect employees' rights to fair representation by the bargaining representative. In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 61 the Court, in order to avoid serious constitutional questions presented by the act's establishment of the majority union as exclusive bargaining representative, found that the RLA obligated unions to bargain fairly on behalf of those they represent. Because this duty, fundamental to the RLA's concept of collective bargaining, cannot be enforced by either the NRAB or the NMB, 62 the Supreme Court held that NorrisLaGuardia does not prevent the issuance of injunctions to enforce the Steele doctrine, relying on Virginian Ry. 63 Another explanation of both the Virginian Ry. and Steele lines of cases has been the observation that neither involved activity specifically immunized by section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. Although the activities were admittedly "labor disputes" within the literal scope of section l's interdiction against injunctions in all labor disputes, later decisions have held that section 1 may be circumscribed when protection of the activity in question seems inconsistent with the procedures and policies of Norris-LaGuardia. For example, mandatory injunctions compelling arbitration have been permitted because the procedures of section 7 are patently inapplicable to such disputes and because section 8 of Norris-LaGuardia demonstrates that Congress looked favorably on arbitration. 6 5 the Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of an injunction against a strike-activity protected by section 4. The union struck over grievances after the railroad had submitted the disputes to the NRAB. Norris-LaGuardia, the Court found, did not prohibit injunctive relief against a strike designed to defeat the compulsory jurisdiction of the NRAB. Chicago River recognized that NorrisLaGuardia and the RLA were "part of a pattern of labor legislation" 0 6 and that the two statutes must be accommodated "so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved."
67 Norris-LaGuardia, the Court reasoned, freed labor from federal regulation and allowed it to pursue its goals through 61. 323 U. S. 192 (1944 The view that Norris-LaGuardia's primary purpose was to guarantee labor's freedom by allowing free interplay of economic force greatly oversimplifies the problem of accommodating that statute with later labor legislation. Under this interpretation, the prohibition against injunctions can be lifted wherever Congress, in a later statute, has indicated a contrary wish to limit or redirect economic warfare. 69 This view ignores Norris-LaGuardia's hostility to the labor injunction itself as a regulatory sanction, a policy which the draftsmen of the 1934 RLA amendments did not consider. The Court must ask, therefore, not whether Congress intended to replace economic warfare with peaceful arbitration (as it did), but whether that policy is sufficiently important in this instance to warrant use of an otherwise undesirable remedy. Moreover, since the congressional hostility to injunctive relief has not been contradicted by later legislation, the court must also make certain that other remedies cannot be used to avoid conflict with Norris-LaGuardia. If these criteria had been applied in Chicago River, the result might still have been the same. The NRAB's grievance machinery is essential to the regulatory scheme of the act, and an integral part of the collective bargaining machinery developed in industries affected by the act. 7 0 And the finding that NRAB procedure would be rendered "nugatory" without injunctive relief 71 indicates the Court's belief that other relief, such as damage actions against the union, was not available under the RLA or, if available, would be ineffectual in securing compliance 68. Id. at 41. An injunction is not available under Chicago River unless one of the parties has submitted the dispute to the NRAB. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 353 U.S. 927 (1957) (per curiamn) (injunction granted by Missouri court under F-LA vacated without prejudice to its reinstatement if either party to the "minor" dispute submitted it to the NRAB within a reasonable time). Moreover, a strike cannot be enjoined, however undesirable its purpose, unless the union's aim is to violate the RLA. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960) (extreme form of feather-bedding).
69. Commentators who regard government neutrality in labor disputes as the dominant policy of Norris-LaGuardia thus tend to simplify the conflict between that statute and later acts as a clash between policies of laissez faire and governmental intervention. See Loeb, Accommodation of the ANorris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal Statutes, 11 LAB. L.J. 473, 476 (1960) , 72 HARv. L. REv. 354, 356-57 (1958 Although the RLA does not authorize damage actions to compensate for violations of the act, the availability of such relief would seem implicit in the Chicago River decision, which allows similarly unauthorized equitable relief to a private party. On the other hand, one court has held that the lack of specific authorization for damage actions, when contrasted to § 301 of Taft-Hartley, indicates that such actions cannot be brought under the RLA. Louisville & N.R. R. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1958) . In this event, the Chicago River finding that injunctive relief is necessary would be unquestionable.
with the statutory grievance procedure. Nevertheless, enunciating the decision to override Norris-LaGuardia in this manner would make it clear that NorrisLaGuardia is not repudiated by every statute which seeks to limit the free use of economic power, and that even when the anti-injunction statute must be set aside, the court should cut away only so much of the statute as is necessary to avoid the conflict. Provisions such as the act's procedural safeguards, which do not hamper enforcement of the RLA, should be retained in deference to the still vital policy against injunctions3 2
Post-Accommodation Problems
When deciding whether to subordinate Norris-LaGuardia's policies to those of another statute, courts should also be aware that new legal problems may be created by the availability of the injunction. Many substantive legal rules developed before injunctive relief was made available may take on a different complexion after the barriers of Norris-LaGuardia have been lowered. For example, certain inequities of the existing law might have been tolerated in the past because of an implicit belief that, in the last resort, the union could overcome its disadvantage by resort to economic force. When this ultimate safeguard is withdrawn, courts may feel compelled to tinker with the existing legal rules in order to redress the resulting imbalance, reassuming the policymaking function which Norris-LaGuardia attempted to reserve to Congress. The difficulties inherent in this corrective process are illustrated by the subsequent history of the Chicago River problem.
The Chicago River decision raised the fear that management could make extensive unilateral changes in the collective bargaining agreement shielded by the strike injunction from union reprisals. Although the Chicago River injunction is permitted only in the case of "minor" disputes 73 -"growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements" 74 -and thus would seem not to affect the union's power to strike over changes in terms of the agreement (so called "major disputes"), the limitation was feared to be illusory. Arguably, management could bring any disputed change under the "minor" disputes jurisdiction of the NRAB by finding an ambiguity in the contract to support its position. The typical railway labor dispute involves the vague management-prerogatives provisions of the contract. 75 The carrier, HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 82 [1960] [1961] in the interests of efficiency, makes operational or technological changes resulting in lay-offs or otherwise affecting working conditions. If the contract grants management all prerogatives not explicitly surrendered, the contract permits the change; if, on the other hand, all existing working conditions are incorporated into the contract, management is changing the terms of the agreement. Thus, the dispute is "minor" in the sense that there is an ambiguity which may be resolved only by "interpretation or application of the agreement," and the union can be enjoined from striking until the NRAB resolves the interpretation dispute.
In theory, the union is protected against unilateral changes by this procedure, for if the NRAB decides that the contract did not allow management to make the change, the union can receive retroactive relief for damages suffered while the change was in force. And if management continues to insist upon the change, the union can then use economic force to resist it. 76 It has been argued, however, that the excessive delay of NRAB procedures tends to make both these protective remedies ineffective . 7 Discharged workers cannot afford to wait out the five-year NRAB adjudication in the hope of reinstatement and back pay.
7 8 And since existing case law allowed management to institute its proposed changes during the NRAB proceeding, 7 9 the union will find it difficult to rouse economic pressure five years later over a dead issue. For these reasons, the argument concludes, the injunction destroys the unions right to use economic force to resist unilateral changes.
Because the alleged hardship to the union arises from the delay between the institution of proposed changes by management and the NRAB's final decision, corrective measures would seem to require either that management be ordered to postpone changes until after adjudication, or that delay be eliminated by permitting the federal court to resolve contract ambiguities immediately. Before Chicago River, both of these alternatives had been rejected. See, e.g., 137 NRAB AWARDS, IST Div. (1958 
1960]
HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 83 1960-1961 considerations of usage, practice, and custom in the industry, the question was "intricate and technical" and had been left by Congress to the specially constituted NRAB. 81 Also, the Court apparently rejected the union's plea for a temporary injunction against the proposed changes, and permitted the employer to make the changes pending final adjudication by the NRAB.
s2
After Chicago River, however, the Supreme Court modified the minor-disputes procedure, apparently in the belief that the availability of strike injunctions had created the alleged hardship and thus had altered the balance of power. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., it authorized courts issuing strike injunctions under Chicago River to condition injunctive relief upon preservation of the status quo by management pending final adjudication by the NRAB. 83 The holding relies principally on the traditional power of equity courts to impose conditions upon issuance of extraordinary remedies when necessary to avoid injustices. The decision requires, therefore, that the court may not impose the status quo condition unless it finds that the immediate institution of proposed management changes will cause irreparable injury to the union. In addition, the Court commented that the status quo condition may be necessary to preserve the integrity of NRAB procedures, reasoning that the prolonged impact of changed conditions may so weaken the union's position that final victory before the NRAB would be meaningless. Since the condition comes into force only when a strike has been enjoined, 8 4 it seems intended as a device to compensate for the potential hardships caused by the Chicago River decision. S. 528 (1960) . This device is not an injunction in the usual sense, for the word "condition" seems to indicate that retention of the status quo by the employer is merely a prerequisite to injunctive relief against union economic pressure. If the employer refuses to fulfill this requirement, he would not, therefore, be subject to contempt proceedings, but the union would be free to strike.
81.
84. The Court stated that it was not deciding the question whether a status quo injunction could be issued against employer changes in the absence of a suit for equitable relief against a strike. Id. at 531 n.3. The Court had, however, denied such relief sub silentio in Pitney. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. And the grievance procedure established by the RLA would not seem to authorize such relief. See notes 88-89 infra and accompanying text.
The Court's argument that the "condition" may be necessary to preserve the NRAB's jurisdiction, while appearing to furnish an independent ground for the status quo injunction under the Chicago River rationale, see text accompanying note 65 supra, seems instead intended to show that when such conditions are imposed upon issuance of a Chicago River injunction, the policy underlying injunctive relief will be fostered by the condition.
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HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 84 1960-1961 In attempting to compensate, however, the Court may have defeated the Railway Labor Act policies which Chicago River sought to promote. Availability of the status quo order will probably discourage compulsory arbitration and use of the NRAB. If an employer wishes to effectuate technological changes in an area where his authority is unclear, submission of the question to the NRAB will, after A-K-T, mean a delay of several years before the change can be made. Because such delay may destroy the value of the change, the carrier may prefer either to eschew relief under Chicago River or to bypass the NRAB entirely. Unless the union is too weak to resist by economic force, it too will prefer to avoid the delay of NRAB proceedings, for the status quo condition is available to it only at the cost of the corollary strike injunction. Since the NRAB cannot act unless one of the parties invokes its jurisdiction,"' such disputes are likely to be settled outside the statutory grievance machinery, by resort to economic force.
Moreover, the M-K-T decision assigns to the courts the power to re-evaluate and reject traditional procedures of grievance arbitration which Congress had incorporated into the RLA. Recognizing management's continuing need to seek more efficient methods, traditional procedure leaves management free to act immediately on good faith interpretations of the collective agreement. The union may protest such determinations only through grievance proceedings, 6 which protect the union from violations of the collective agreement by awarding retroactive relief to injured employees. Although such relief may not fully compensate injured employees, there is no better alternative-management cannot be compensated for opportunities lost when changes are delayed.
8 This practice antedated the RLA, s and that act, by establishing detailed provisions for compulsory arbitration of grievances without explicitly reversing the traditional pattern, apparently incorporated it. 8 9 The need for such management freedom is particularly apparent in the declining railway industry, where con- 
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tinual technical innovation is essential to the industry's survival.
0 M-K-T seems to disregard the congressional approval of this grievance procedure; the Supreme Court authorized district courts to balance "competing claims of irreparable hardship" 91 in each dispute and to come to their own conclusion as to which party should bear the burdens of grievance arbitration. Comparison of relative hardships ultimately forces a court to decide how much hardship labor or management ought to bear in the collective bargaining process and thus injects the judiciary into precisely that delicate policy-making area which Norris-LaGuardia preserves to Congress. The dangers of judicial intervention are clearly demonstrated by the result in M-K-T. The status quo condition does not correct the imbalance supposedly engendered by the Chicago River decision; rather, it enlarges and reverses it by shifting the risk of loss to management, the party without any remedy in the NRAB.
92
While the disturbance of basic RLA policies is itself a sufficient ground for questioning the wisdom of judicial tinkering, the attempted correction in M-K-T was particularly inappropriate because it was unnecessary. Closer examination of the precise impact of Chicago River reveals that the union's power to strike over "minor" disputes was not seriously curtailed by that decision. A union anxious to strike over a "minor" dispute can do so simply by terminating the contract after 30 days notice and proposing new contract provisions which would retroactively prohibit the changes instituted by management. In a post-Chicago River decision, the Supreme Court held that this tactic creates a "major" dispute in which injunctive relief is not available.
93 Thus, the restrictive effect of Chicago River upon which M-K-T seems predicated, is in fact nominal, for a union may still, after following the proper procedures, resort to economic force to win its point.
The problems raised by superimposing injunctive relief upon the provisions of the Railway Labor Act demonstrate that accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia involves more than the task of weighing conflicting indications of legislative intent. Courts must also attempt to gauge the dislocating effect which the availability of injunctive relief may have upon established statutory rules and procedures. This problem should not have affected the Chicago River decision, for the dislocation later found in M-K-T was in fact illusory. 160 (1958) , governing procedures for the resolution of "major" disputes, indicate that when Congress desired that the status quo be maintained during a dispute, the draftsmen so provided in explicit terms. On the other hand, if the court is convinced that injunctive relief will require further corrective adjustments in the regulatory statute, this possibility should weigh against the initial decision to abandon Norris-LaGuardia. The results of judicial adjustment in M-K-T demonstrate that the need to make further corrections will reinstall the courts squarely in the role of labor policy-making, as well as jeopardize the very policies which seem to require injunctive relief. In this event, courts might better effectuate the overall scheme of national labor policy by choosing to abide by Norris-LaGuardia from the beginning.
See Horowitz, Labor's Role in the Declining
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF LABOR UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Conflicts between the policies of Norris-LaGuardia and those of the Sherman Act 94 compel courts to reconcile statutes dealing with different, but overlapping, spheres of economic activity. While the anti-injunction statute deals solely with union activity, the antitrust law's primary concern is with the promotion of business competition. 9 5 Indeed, it is doubtful that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, intended to bring unions within its prohibitions.
96
Judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act's vague mandates, however, brought many union activities within their ambit.
97 Federal judges, unfettered by any statutory standard, enforced their policy preferences by the application of vague, abstract doctrines essentially unrelated to the fundamental policy decisions being made. -7, 10 (1958) .
ATT'v GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 1 (1955).
96. The principal .argument for the inclusion of labor organizations was that Congress had rejected a proposed amendment explicitly exempting unions. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) . A thorough search of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, however, has led one author to conclude that the proposed amendment was offered before a substantially revised bill was submitted by the Senate Judiciary Committee and that Congress assumed that this latter measure did not reach union activities. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT 3-54 (1930 98. On the one hand, the Supreme Court stated that the "mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the AntiTrust Act." Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1929) . Nevertheless, in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 47 (1927) , a refusal to work on "blacklisted" goods was found to be a violation because it was "an attack upon the use of the product in other states ... with the intent and purpose of apparently attempted to modify these judicial restrictions," 9 but the Supreme Court effectively nullified the provisions in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering 1 00 by construing them as a codification of existing law. Moreover, some lower federal courts, shielded from effective review because labor disputes seldom survived issuance of the injunction, 101 extended the doctrines beyond even the decidedly anti-union precedents of the Supreme Court, and applied the antitrust laws to any activity the judiciary considered harmful.
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After 1930, however, congressional approbation of collective bargaining expressed in Norris-LaGuardia and the Wagner Act, coupled with increased Supreme Court awareness of the need for judicial self-restraint in the labor field, caused a reversal of the restrictive precedents. The Court held in Apex Hosiery Co. v . Leader that union activities did not violate the antitrust laws unless they resulted in a "restraint upon commercial competition.
'1 0 ( 3 In a well-considered dictum, the Court indicated that organizational and recognitional efforts would not be such a restraint even if aimed at protecting unionized employers from competition with nonunion goods produced at a lower labor cost. 04 While Apex was an attempt to narrow the Sherman Act's pro- [Vol. 70 :70
HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 88 1960-1961 hibitions, its "commercial restraints" test provided no standards by which antitrust violations could be identified. 1 0 5 Thus the decision left courts free to continue evaluating the legitimacy of labor objectives, preserving much of the Sherman Act's impact on labor. Opportunities for enforcing the remaining antitrust restrictions seemed limited, however, by Norris-LaGuardia's prohibition of injunctive relief, for the injunction bar was held applicable to antitrust suits against unions. 10 6 Avoiding this restriction, the Attorney General's office began a series of criminal prosecutions against unions engaging in certain activities felt to be especially detrimental to the economy.
10 7 The first such prosecution to reach the Supreme Court, United States v. Hutcheson, was brought against the Carpenters Union for striking to secure jobs which, under the terms of a collective agreement, were reserved for members of the Machinists Union. The Court held that Norris-LaGuardia, although on its face applicable only to injunction suits, was intended to restore the broad purpose of the Clayton Act which Duplex had nullified. 109 Reasoning that the Sherman, Norris-LaGuardia, and Clayton Acts must be read together "as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct,"" 0 the Court held that it was incongruous to prohibit by criminal penalties conduct allowable in equity.-" Consequently, union activities specified in section 20 of the Clayton Act were held immune from Sherman Act liability regardless of the remedy sought.
105. The opinion itself is unclear, for it attempts to reconcile most of the older cases with its new approach and suggests at one place that the size of the strike may be determinative. Id. at 512-13.
106. Local 753, Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940) .
The "commercial restraints" distinction led the Attorney General's Committee to comment, From this decision there emerges a distinction ... between union activities aiming, on the one hand, at furthering rightful uniom objectives and, on the other, at directly "suppressing [commercial competition] or fixing prices" of commercial products. Avr'Y GEN. NAT"L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 296 (1955 
1960]
HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 89 1960-1961 [S]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and illicit under section 20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means.1 2 While the language and legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia give no evidence of specific congressional intent to grant this immunity, policies of that statute and the National Labor Relations Act seem to compel the result reached in Hutcheson. Both Norris-LaGuardia, withdrawing the injunctive source of judicial regulation, and the NLRA, through the establishment of a specialized agency, reflect congressional desire to depose the judiciary from their self-appointed role as arbiters of the labor-management struggle and to make the formulation of labor policy solely a legislative and administrative responsibility."
3 Apex, focusing solely on the modification of legal rules, sanctioned a continuation of judicial regulation and thus failed to recognize this new policy. Hutcheson, however, looking to the institutional structure established by Congress, accommodated the new policies by reasserting the limitations of section 20 to eliminate the Sherman Act as a vehicle for unwanted judicial policy making.
The Court has found an exception to Hutcheson's broad exemption when unions act in concert with nonlabor groups. In Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,  114 the local union secured closed shop contracts with manufacturers and contractors dealing in electrical equipment in New York City, and all three groups established a system under which the contractors bought only from unionized manufacturers, and the manufacturers, in turn, sold only to unionized contractors. A board was created to bring recalcitrant employers into line, the union enforcing the system through strikes and picketing. The boycott extended to all goods not manufactured by Local 3, excluding from the New York market even products of firms organized by other locals of the same international union. The Court found that the conspiracy between the employers alone would have been a clear violation of the antitrust laws." 5 It also found that the union's activities were a "labor dispute" as defined by section 13 of Norris-LaGuardia."
6 Under Hutcheson, therefore, such union activities would normally have been exempted from the antitrust laws. Facing the question whether collusion with an employer combination took labor outside the Hutcheson shelter, the Court reasoned that the immunity from anti-112. Id. at 232. 113. A conflict in substantive law also existed. Section 7 of the NLRA gave employees "the right... to engage in. . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 49 Stat. 452 (1935) , as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958) . Sherman Act case-law outlawed many such activities. See notes 97-98 supra. This conflict, however, might have been resolved by attempting to redefine the Sherman Act's limitations on labor activities-as Apex apparently attempted to do.
114. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
115. Id. at 800.
116. Id. at 807 n.12.
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HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 90 1960-1961 trust prosecutions had been granted only for the purpose of aiding the union's collective bargaining and was never intended to be used as a shield to protect businessmen in achieving monopoly conditions forbidden by antitrust law.
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The Court seemed to assume that a finding of union immunity would have allowed the entire conspiracy to continue, for in enjoining the union it failed to consider the alternative of dissolving the conspiracy simply by enjoining employers from combining with each other or with the union. That the AllenBradley decision turned on the Court's fear of shielding business participants from antitrust prosecution is further emphasized by the Court's holding that collusion with nonlabor organizations is essential to the union's liability.
[T)he same labor union activities [having the same economic effect] may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups .... A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act." 8 Although an exception to Hutcheson, Allen-Bradley does not raise the dangers of judicial policy-making which were present under the courts' general Sherman Act jurisdiction. The immunities granted by Norris-LaGuardia and Hutcheson 118 were in part motivated by the fear that, in the absence of antitrust standards applicable to union conduct, courts would use Sherman Act jurisdiction to make their own policy judgments about the legitimacy of union conduct. In Allen-Bradley, however, the existence of the antitrust violation was based upon an analysis of management conduct, according to antitrust principles dealing with business activities. The union's activity was found to be one part of a much larger inter-employer conspiracy. 120 Thus the Court was able to resolve the problem of the union violation by reference to principles of business conduct which bore no relation to the legitimacy or desirability of the union activity involved. Indeed, the Court admitted that the union was furthering its own legitimate interest in jobs and wages, question whether it participates in a management conspiracy, aiding the forbidden practices. Separating the employer's action from the union's conduct in order to resolve the antitrust problem may be difficult, however, when there is not an independent and far-reaching management conspiracy as in Allen-Bradley. Many terms of collective agreements tend to restrict competition within an industry, providing uniform wage rates, work rules, and provisions against labor saving devices.
122 These terms may meet with the approval of a majority of the employers who prefer to suppress cost-cutting practices of a competitor for the purpose of obtaining higher prices. The Allen-Bradley distinction between practices engaged in by the union alone or as part of an employer conspiracy would seem to require a determination whether management somehow conspired to obtain anticompetitive terms, or whether it submitted to them through the process of collective bargaining. Cases dealing with such problems after Allen-Bradley have looked to evidence indicating whether the employers favored or opposed the union's objective.
1 23 While such standards are difficult to apply when union and management have a mutual interest, they have at least the advantage of remaining neutral to the legitimacy of the union objective involved. On the other hand, the substantive nature of the union's demand might in some cases raise a presumption of management collusion. A contractual provision fixing prices or restricting the suppliers or distributors with whom a group of employers may deal 12 by virtue of its uniqueness and apparently predominant benefit to management, may itself be evidence that the employers have actively conspired to secure such terms, and in turn render the union's conduct an antitrust violation. In judging the peculiarity of any particular term of a collective agreement for this purpose, the court will be judging union conduct according to some unspecified norm of traditional union objectives and practices. 12 5 122. The problem has arisen in areas where a union has organized all the major competing businesses in a trade, and one of these, through a particular method of operations, is able to secure a competitive advantage over the other firms. The union, in order to protect jobs, may then, with or without the "collusion" of the other employers, attempt to secure contract provisions destroying this advantage. See Jewel Tea Co., Inc. v. Local 189, 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958); Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946 Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 145 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1956 ).
125. Allen-Bradley may also apply to cases involving one employer and one union. See, e.g., United States v. Bitz, 179 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1959 ) (agreement to exclude competitors from the market). Since the employer in Bitz was attempting to monopolize and thus was guilty of an employer violation acting alone, the case does not raise the issue whether an employer-union conspiracy will satisfy the conspiracy requirement of § 1 of the [Vol. 70 :70 HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 92 1960-1961 Broader exceptions to Hutcheson have been urged by the Attorney General's Report and are reflected in several lower court decisions after AllenBradley. The Report reasons that activity aimed at "direct commercial restraint" may not be a labor dispute within the meaning of Norris-LaGuardia,' 12 whether or not there is collusion with nonlabor groups. This interpretation seeks to keep the Apex doctrine in force. Similarly, courts examining joint activity have emphasized the legitimacy of the labor objective involved rather than looking to the existence of a management violation.
127
These exceptions would inject judges into matters of labor policy without sufficient legislative guidance, contrary to the Norris-LaGuardia policy explained in Hitcheson. The importance and continued vitality of that policy is underscored by congressional action since the Hutcheson decision, 2 8 for Congress has continued to assume the task of regulating union activity which affects competitive market conditions. In the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress subjected a wide range of union activity to NLRB regulation; and, in passing that statute, it considered problems of anticompetitive union behavior. A proposal to withdraw the Clayton Act's exemption of labor unions when they engaged in direct market restraint was specifically rejected in conference. The conference report explained, Since the matters dealt with in this section have to a large measure been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the conference agreement contains effective provisions directly dealing with boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted from the conference agreement.
Problems of accommodating Norris-LaGuardia to the Taft-Hartley Act 131 are radically different from those encountered under either the Sherman Act or the Railway Labor Act, for Taft-Hartley was enacted by a Congress aware of the limitations of Norris-LaGuardia. The act permits use of injunctions in certain situations but surrounds their issuance with elaborate procedures and safeguards. Under sections 10(j) and (1), the NLRB is empowered to seek injunctions against suspected unfair labor practices prior to final Board adjudication.
13 2 Because such relief is not available to private parties and may be sought only after a specialized agency has made preliminary findings of fact and law justifying issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint, 133 many of the evils associated with the private use of injunctions in labor disputes are thus eliminated. Sections 206 to 210, dealing with "national emergency strikes," also allow injunctive relief for a period of eighty days, but only upon the discretionary order of the President.
1 3 Only section 302, dealing with employer payments to union representatives and the management of pension and welfare funds, explicitly allows private parties to seek injunctions ;135 but these areas are peripheral to the labor objectives and activities protected by Norris-LaGuardia, and the controversies under this section often may not be section 13 "labor disputes. '136 In all these provisions, Congress stated explicitly that Norris-LaGuardia was not applicable. Moreover, analysis of the debates on Taft-Hartley reveal a congressional belief that Norris-LaGuardia would remain in effect where not specifically overruled.
137 Finally, the restrictions placed upon use of injunctive relief and the importance of the issue in legislative debates 13s demonstrate the continued suspicion of injunctions as a remedy in labor disputes.
These limitations, however, have not prevented federal courts from issuing injunctions, without express statutory authorization, to compel majority rep-131. Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947 ), as amended, 73 Stat. 519 (1959 , 29 U.S.C. § § 141-52, 155-57, 161-63, 165-85 (1958 155-57, 161-63, 165-85 ( ), 29 U.S.C.A. § § 153-54, 158-60, 164, 186-87 (Supp. 1959 . Act § § 10(j) & (1), 61 Stat. 149 (1947 ), as amended, 72 Stat. 945 (1959 , 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) ( ), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l) (Supp. 1959 . Section 10(j) authorizes the NLRB to seek in its discretion an injunction against alleged unfair labor practices after issuance of a complaint by theGeneral Counsel; 10(1) requires that such relief be sought as a prerequisite to issuing a complaint against alleged violations of § § 8(b) (4) (A-C),-(b) (7),-(e).
Labor-Management Relations
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HeinOnline --70 Yale L.J. 94 1960-1961 resentatives to bargain fairly on behalf of those they represent. 1 3 9 This duty, derived from an identical duty imposed on railway unions by the Steele doctrine, 140 has been read into the exclusive representation provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Arguably, use of injunctions to enforce the Steele mandate can be reconciled with Taft-Hartley's intent to preserve Norris-LaGuardia on the ground that none of these cases involve activities specifically immunized by section 4 of the anti-injunction statute.
14 1 Section 4 has been used as a guide to discover the activities which Congress particularly wished to shield from injunctive relief.'4 But the legislative history and statutory language of Norris-LaGuardia clearly indicate that injunctions are prohibited in all "labor disputes," regardless of whether such activities are enumerated in section 4.143 A further attempt to distinguish these cases rests on the view that injunctive relief under Steele is necessary to avoid a challenge to the constitutionality of the NLRA. Without injunctive relief, it is argued, the right to fair representation would be inefficacious and the statutory system of exclusive representation would violate rights of the minority.'4 Since the Steele duty was created by the courts and is not explicitly mentioned in the act it may be possible to infer that Congress never considered the question of remedies to enforce that duty. Thus, the Court's approval of Steele injunctions would not repudiate the general congressional policy to limit injunctive relief under the Taft-Hartley Act. It would not, for example, serve as a precedent for allowing injunctive relief to enforce duties specifically enumerated in the act.
The 143. Norris-LaGuardia's statutory language by prohibiting all injunctions in nonviolent labor disputes, see note 33 supra and accompanying text, does not limit the act's protections to the activities specified in § 4. Thus, the Senate Report stated, "The same rule throughout the bill, wherever applicable, applies both to employers and employees." S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1932) . Since § 4 specifies activities engaged in only by unions, the scope of the act may not be limited to their protection without violating congressional intent.
144. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N. Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1944) (concurring opinion). Mr. Justice Murphy, although concurring in the result, rejected the majority opinion because he wanted to state explicitly that the RLA would be unconstitutional without incorporation of the Steele doctrine.
145. Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 61 Stat. 156 (1947) , 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958) . plenary jurisdiction over suits between unions and employers for violation of contracts.
146 Prior to section 301, it was generally assumed that Norris-LaGuardia protected strikes in breach of contract. 147 In 1932, legal enforceability of labor contracts was not regarded as crucial to effective bargaining; indeed, the prevailing philosophy, most clearly demonstrated by Norris-LaGuardia itself, was that the law should play only a minimal role in labor relations. 4 Moreover, the legislative history and statutory language of Norris-LaGuardia indicate a strong congressional desire to avoid judicially-created exceptions to its broad prohibitions, 149 and, since a strike in breach of contract is usually a section 13 labor dispute involving activities protected by section 4, the act seems to leave federal courts powerless to enjoin such conduct. But section 301's mandate to enforce collective agreements may compel relaxation of Norris-LaGuardia's limitations. In Chicago River, the Supreme Court enjoined a strike intended to evade the compulsory arbitration provisions of the RLA, reasoning that policies of later legislation may take precedence over Strikes in violation of the arbitration provisions of a collective agreement might be analogous to the Chicago River situation, for, if permitted, they might destroy the effectiveness of contractual arbitration. Moreover, the establishment of a clear federal policy to protect and enforce these contracts erases the danger that judges enjoining strikes in derogation of contract provisions would be fashioning law according to their own views of social policy. 151 Indeed, the very prohibition against judicial lawmaking may be inapplicable in contract actions, for section 301, as construed in Textile The legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia also seems inconclusive. The issue was raised only by those opposing the bill who stated that its provisions would prohibit injunctions against stoppages violative of contract provisions. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1932) The argument that the congressional intent expressed in Norris-LaGuardia has been superceded by the basic policy of section 301 misconceives the problem, for, unlike the Chicago River situation, section 301 was passed with full awareness of Norris-LaGuardia and the evils of labor injunctions. The primary inquiry, therefore, must be directed to the specific intent of Congress when Taft-Hartley was enacted. The legislative history of section 301 indicates that this provision was not intended as a sub silentio authorization of injunctive relief. The Senate version of the bill made breaches of collective agreements unfair labor practices and gave the NLRB power under section 10 (j) to enjoin violations.
15 7 The House, on the other hand, gave jurisdiction over collective agreements to the courts and explicitly authorized issuance of injunctions to private parties. 55 The conference committee accepted this House version, which became section 301, but eliminated the provision repealing Norris-LaGuardia.'r 9 In view of Congress' explicitly stated belief that Norris-LaGuardia forbade the enjoining of strikes in breach of contract, 160 and that Norris-LaGuardia remained in force unless explicitly repealed, 16 ' omission of the in-junction clause from section 301 indicates a refusal to allow injunctive relief. 10 2 Lower federal courts have generally adopted this position.
1 3
Admittedly, retention of Norris-LaGuardia in section 301 actions will render judicial enforcement of that section's policy less effective. The threat of damage actions, provided by section 301,16 may not curtail all strikes in derogation of arbitration; the union may decide that the value of the objective sought outweighs the cost of damages. 165 Nevertheless, the damage action would be a deterrent in many cases, 166 and the congressional rejection of more effective injunctive relief 137 seems to indicate satisfaction, or at least unwillingness, to go beyond this method of enforcement.
Even if the legislative history did not contain evidence of a specific refusal to allow injunctive relief, congressional awareness of the possibility that Nor-ris-LaGuardia might cripple enforcement of new policies, and the failure explicitly to resolve this conflict raise a strong presumption in favor of retaining the injunction bar, despite its potentially harmful effect. Because of this awareness, accommodation of Taft-Hartley with Norris-LaGuardia does not afford the judiciary the same freedom to choose appropriate remedies that was necessarily allowed under the Railway Labor Act, where absolutely no indication of congressional preference for either of the conflicting policies can be found.
Moreover, authorizing strike injunctions in breach of contract suits would raise again the danger of unfairness implicit in the hasty adjudication of temporary injunction cases. While contract law presents a more precise standard than the old common law of labor, doctrines created under section 301, arising out of the labor-management struggle and colored by it, are likely to lack the precision of principles derived from commercial contract law.
1 8 The Supreme Court has recently held that the common law of labor agreements cannot always be based upon traditional notions of contract.
169 Even direct application of commercial precedents to the loosely-drawn, frequently ambiguous collective agreements will present problems not amenable to hasty decision. For example, under an agreement lacking a broad no-strike clause, a union's right to engage in work stoppages may be governed by an "implied promise" not to strike over arbitrable issues."7 0 The scope of the arbitration provision-a much-debated question in the federal courts--cannot be resolved by reference to rules of thumb but may be decided only after careful consideration of the complex factors involved in construing collective agreements.
1
Nor does Lincoln Mills, by allowing specific enforcement of arbitration clauses against management, create an imbalance requiring the same remedy to be made available for violations of no-strike provisions; for the apparent inequality of remedies is, in fact, a proper adjustment to the difference in the tactical positions of management and labor when either refuses to arbitrate. Injunctive relief against management's refusal is necessary because a damage action for breach of the promise to submit to arbitration would furnish the union only nominal relief." 2 But when the union strikes in refusing to arbi-trate, the factor of strike losses makes the damage award a substantial deter- Council of Carpenters, however, the California Supreme Court concluded that state law must be subordinated to the federal law of labor contracts, in order to avoid uncertainty and disparity of litigants' rights. 175 As a result state courts would be bound to follow, and to participate in formulating, the federal common law of labor contracts. According to Lincoln Mills, formulation of the federal common law must be governed by federal labor policy.'.7 Since Norris-LaGuardia represents a part of the federal labor policy, arguably state courts should be limited by Norris-LaGuardia when applying federal law. The California court in McCarroll, however, rejected this thesis, reasoning that neither Norris-LaGuardia nor section 301 were intended to deprive state courts of their injunctive powers, and that state injunctive relief would not affect the uniformity of litigants' rights.177 McCarroll's evaluation of the legislative intent underlying both Norris-LaGuardia and section 301 seems correct. Norris-LaGuardia was directed only to federal courts.'
78 In Taft-Hartley, Congress recognized the existence of state remedies when drafting the act, 1 79 and yet evinced no intention of affecting the enforcement powers THE YALE LAW JO URNAL result demanded of federal courts rests upon the notion that the federal court sitting in diversity cases promotes no independent federal interest, 183 but is merely another court of the state. State courts hearing labor contract actions, on the other hand, may have an independent interest in labor relations, as evidenced by the long history of state jurisdiction over labor contract matters, and although the logical extension of Lincoln Mills would apparently require uniformity, this state interest should not be lightly dismissed in the absence of either specific congressional intent to the contrary, or outright conflict with Taft-Hartley policy. Thus, even accepting the argument that state injunctive relief sanctions disparate results, the disparity would not seem to require rejection of the McCarroll conclusion that state courts preserve their injunctive power in section 301 suits. 
